Another View of Japan




Communist China And Asia Challenge To American Policy : Internet Archive




Ever since the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they have regarded Japan as a major target in their efforts to expand Communist influence in Asia. [...] Japan in the Far East, like Germany in Central Europe, occupies a key position and represents a major obstacle to the spread of communism.




The decline of Chinese influence in Northeast Asia brought little gain to the Koreans, however, for both Russia and Japan competed to replace China as the dominant power. At the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 Japan compelled China to recognize Korea's complete independence. Ten years later, after the Russo-Japanese War, it forced the Russians to acknowledge Japan's "paramount political, military, and economic interests" in Korea, and, with their hands freed by this double victory, the Japanese first established a protectorate over the peninsula and then finally annexed it in 1910.





With the notable exception of Thailand, the entire area was dominated by Western colonialism until World War II. Then Southeast Asia was conquered by Japan, and the Japanese occupation helped to shatter the structure of Western colonial power, giving added impetus to the growing strength of anticolonialism and nationalism. By the end of the war nationalism had become the dominant political force in South and Southeast Asia, and within a very few years after the war most of the nations in the region had achieved their independence, leaving only a few pockets of colonial rule.







As far back as 1927, when I was in Moscow, the attitude toward the United States in the event of war was discussed. Privately, it was the opinion of all the Russian leaders to whom I spoke that the rivalry between the United States and Japan must actually break out into war between these two. The Russians were hopeful that the war would break out soon, because that would greatly secure the safety of Russia's Siberian borders and would so weaken Japan that Russia would no longer have to fear an attack from her in the East. Stalin hopes through the activities of the American Communist Party to create a public opinion in the United States that would favor a war, presumably in the defense of democracy against the encroachment of Fascism, but actually against Japan.

I confess; the truth about American communism : Internet Archive(485ページ)







It is, of course, the heartiest hope of the Soviet Government that the United States will become involved in a war with Japan. […] The Soviet Union would certainly attempt to avoid becoming an ally until Japan had been thoroughly defeated and would then merely use the opportunity to acquire Manchuria and Sovietize China.

The final conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union with regard to the war they desire so ardently between the United States and Japan is that Japan would be defeated, that a Communist Government would then be set up in Japan, and Japan and the Soviet Union would then move happily hand in hand to establish communism in China.

Foreign relations of the United States.... | Hathi Trust Digital Library(227ページ)








It is no secret that thousands of young Chinese and other Oriental youths of both sexes have been turned out of Communist universities in Moscow and sent back home to conspire against their governments. The open campaign to bring all China under the rule of Moscow had been waged under the spotlight of publicity; subversive and disruptive forces have overturned established governments in many lands; yet with the evidence before its eyes, the world has condemned Japan for defending her institutions and existence against this menace.

The case for Manchoukuo | Hathi Trust Digital Library(332ページ)










The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department (Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark)


Washington, July 19, 1941.


5.Effect of Further Restrictions on Exports.



(b) It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply petroleum will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result. Japan doubtless knows that wells and machinery probably would be destroyed. If then engaged in war in Siberia, the necessary force for southward adventures might not be immediately available. Furthermore, Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months' war operations. Export restrictions of oil by the United States should be accompanied by similar restrictions by the British and Dutch.




(e) An embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course. Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measures against the British and Dutch, she would also include military action against the Philippines, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war. Whether or not such action will be taken immediately will doubtless depend on Japan's situation at that time with respect to Siberia.




Foreign Relations Of The United States 1941 Volume Iv : Internet Archive(839ページ)






For instance, Professor Nicholas Spykman of Yale wrote in a book published shortly after Pearl Harbor (Americas Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power) that the annihilation of Germany and Japan would open Europe to Soviet domination and observed: "A russian state from the Urals to the North Sea can be great improvement over a German State from the North Sea to the Urals.

Wedemeyer reports | Hathi Trust Digital Library(6ページ)



(妹尾作太男『第二次大戦に勝者なし』上巻 p.36)




To oppose the Japanese domination of China and actively take all available means and occasions to frustrate it ... would, if pursued consistently and determinedly, almost inevitably mean war with Japan ... Such a war would be a major misfortune for us, even assuming our victory ... It would be a hideously long and costly process ... Even the elimination of Japan, if it were possible, would be no blessing to the Far East or to the world. It would merely create a new set of stresses, and substitute for Japan the USSR as the successor of Imperial Russia as a contestant (and at least an equally unscrupulous and dangerous one) for mastery of the East. Nobody except perhaps Russia would gain from our victory in such a war.

John Van Antwerp MacMurray - Wikipedia







Defeat of Japan would invite domination of China by the Soviet Union, for the clash in Asia is not nearly so much between China and Japan as between Japan and the Soviet Union.

From what I have seen of Soviet practices, and from what I have seen of Japanese practices, I must say that I should regard Soviet domination in Asia far more disastrous for China than Japanese domination, and far worse for America and for the world.

Seeking foreign trouble | Hathi Trust Digital Library(18-19ページ)



(田中秀雄 (翻訳)先田賢紀智 (翻訳)『アメリカはアジアに介入するな!』p.208)




米国戦略爆撃調査団 - Summary report (Pacific war) 

From October, 1944, to the end of the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese flew 2,550 Kamikaze missions, of which 475, or 18.6 percent were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses. Warships of all types were damaged, including 12 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, and 16 light and escort carriers. However, no ship larger than an escort carrier was sunk. Approximately 45 vessels were sunk, the bulk of which were destroyers. The Japanese were misled by their own inflated claims of heavy ships sunk, and ignored the advice of their technicians that a heavier explosive head was required to sink large ships. To the United States the losses actually sustained were serious, and caused great concern. Two thousand B-29 sorties were diverted from direct attacks on Japanese cities and industries to striking Kamikaze air fields in Kyushu. Had the Japanese been able to sustain an attack of greater power and concentration they might have been able to cause us to withdraw or to revise our strategic plans.

Summary report (Pacific war) Washington,... | Hathi Trust Digital Library(10ページ)


1944年10月から沖縄戦の終了まで、日本は2550機の神風攻撃を行い、475機18.6%が 確実な戦果を上げている。全艦種に被害が出ていて、12隻の空母、15隻の戦艦、16隻の護衛空母を含んでいる。護衛空母より大きい軍艦は沈んではいない。約45隻の軍艦が沈んでいる。 大半が駆逐艦である。日本軍は大型艦が沈んだとする自らの誇張された主張に欺かれ、技術者が大型弾頭が必要だとアドバイスをしても無視した。アメリカが被った実際の被害は深刻であり、極めて憂慮すべき事態となった。延べ2000機のB29が、日本の都市と産業への直接攻撃から、 九州のカミカゼ基地の攻撃に転用された。日本がより大きな打撃力で集中的な攻撃を持続し得たなら、我々の戦略計画を撤回若しくは変更させ得たかもしれない。




米国戦略爆撃調査団 - Japanese Air Power

The suicide plane was by far the most effective weapon devised by the Japanese for use against surface vessels. Over a period of only 10 months of the 44-month war, suicide planes accounted for 48.1 percent of all United States warships damaged and for 21.3 percent of the ships sunk. But the suicide effort was expensive. During the 10-month period of the employment of the suicide tactic, the 2 air arms expended 2,550 planes to score 474 hits on all types of Allied surface vessels for an effective rate of 18.6 percent.

USSBS Report 62, Military Analysis Division, Japanese Air Power -







“The suicide plane is a very effective weapon, which we must not underestimate,” he wrote. “I do not believe any one who has not been around within its area of operations can realize its potentialities against ships."

The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance - Google ブックス




(訳は 特別攻撃隊 - Wikipedia より)